REUNIFICATION SUNDANCE

By Canute Tangwa
 
We are witnesses to recent events that tend to make or mar; to build or to destroy; to clarify or to obscure; to raise or to dampen spirits. Cameroon will be celebrating its 50 years of reunification this year in Buea, capital of the South West Region, capital of the South West province, capital of West Cameroon, capital of Southern Cameroons and capital of German Kamerun.

Ahmadou Ahidjo; ST Muna; Paul Biya; JN Foncha

Buea is quite loaded, politically. Besides the event proper, a debate has been raging in the virtual and real world: facebook, twitter, social network forums and one and off-line newspapers.

Hon. Paul Ayah Abine of Akwaya triggered the debate when he postulated that there was no legal reunification in 1961 between Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun. In essence, he argues that there is no legal instrument to show that there was a union between both parties. As a judge and jurist, it is difficult to task him on treading where wiser minds dare not.

However, Hon. Ayah’s argument set other minds to work. That is the good thing about belonging to a culture or tradition where the force of argument and not the argument of force counts; a legacy bequeathed by years of English mandate and trusteeship.

A no small fry, Dr Susungi, dug into the Kew Garden archives in England and came out with a stunning revelation: reunification had a legal basis by dint of a Joint Communiqué signed in Yaounde on 14 October 1960 between President Ahmadou Ahidjo of La République du Cameroun (an independent country) and the Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons (still under British Trusteeship), Mr John Ngu Foncha, assisted by ST Muna, AN Jua, WNO Effiom and PM Kemcha.

According to Susungi, the Yaounde Joint Communiqué laid the basis for a federal constitution depending on the outcome of the 1961 plebiscite. It came to pass when Southern Cameroons opted to join La République du Cameroun rather than Nigeria.

Other legal minds like Barrister Charles Taku waded in and asserted that at a meeting with Gorji Dinka, QC sometime in Lagos the latter tore the Yaounde Joint Communique to shreds. But in his posting, Barrister Taku failed to present the arguments of the learned Dinka at the Lagos confab. 

The incisive Tande Dibussi plunged in and urged Susungi not to “give too much importance to a working document, or road map since it was just one out of many resolutions and communiqués signed by Southern Cameroon leaders and Ahidjo during the period in question.”  He further drove the point home by stating that “to demonstrate how little value these documents had in the grander scheme of things, one of these documents clearly stated that “the implementation of reunification cannot be automatic but gradual, with Jua talking of a separate existence of “at least five years.” 

He referenced Professor Victor Julius Ngoh to buttress the following points and fault Susungi’s contentions: the British were very well aware of the October 1960 conference which was convened at their behest; the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly did not adopt the draft Federal Constitution on 18/9/1961 and the motion which was tabled by S.T. Muna did not request for the adoption and/or ratification of the constitution but rather for the approval of the “action of the leaders” of both Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon and the “brotherly manner in which they…conducted the negotiations.”

As one who does not run away from a fight, Susungi produced in extensio the proceedings of the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly of 18/9/1961 and highlighted the motion for the adoption of the draft Federal Constitution as presented by ST  Muna and Motomby Woleta’s dismay at the way the constitution matter was handled by the ruling KNDP party thus laying bare “the secretive nature of Prime Minister J.N Foncha in handling the reunification question”…and the British government’s anger,

«Considering the paramount importance of the issues involved, coupled with the respective strength of the two major parties in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, we consider it a matter of profound regret that neither H.M Government in the United Kingdom nor the government of the Southern Cameroons considered it appropriate to invite the Opposition to take part in the Yaoundé discussions before the so-called “Constitution for a Federal United Kamerun Republic” was signed by Premier J.N Foncha, ‘for and on behalf of the government of the Southern Cameroons’, and President Ahmadou Ahidjo and Prime Minister Asale, ‘for and on behalf of the Cameroun Republic’. 

Since the territory of the Southern Cameroons is still held in trust by H.M government in the United Kingdom, we question very strongly the competence of Premier J.N Foncha to conclude and sign an international agreement of such magnitude ‘for and on behalf of the government of the Southern Cameroons.” He concluded by stating that “there is absolutely no question about the fact that the draft constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon was tabled as a motion on 18.9.1961 or that it was unanimously adopted by our democratically elected leaders.”

For opening a political pandora’s box for reasons best known to him, diehard Southern Cameroonians have seemingly resolved to ensure that Susungi knows no sleep. Thus, Mola Njoh Litumbe scooped out the following salient points for the attention of Susungi and likeminded persons:

•    Special arrangements had to be made for the administration of the UN trust territory of Southern Cameroons, which was administered by the British Governor-General, when Nigeria was to be granted independence on 1 Oct 1960.  Her Majesty the Queen of England then signed an Order-in-Council, referred to as the Southern Cameroons Order in Council that established a ministerial government in Southern Cameroons, effective 1st October, 1960, the date of Nigeria's independence. 

That Order was the Constitution of Southern Cameroons which established the post of Commissioner for Cameroons, with residence in Buea, who was vested with the powers hitherto exercised by the British Governor-General of Nigeria. The Commissioner and all the ministers and secretaries of state in the Government of Southern Cameroons swore allegiance to Her Britannic Majesty, and held office at Her pleasure;

•    The Order also established the West Cameroon House of Chiefs and the West Cameroon House of Assembly, but reserved certain powers of Gov’t to Whitehall, and outside the competence of the West Cameroon administration.  Notably, defence and foreign relations were outside the competence of the West Cameroon House of Assembly. 

Contingents of the British Army were posted in Buea and Bamenda, and were not under the control of the West Cameroon House of Assembly.  Similarly, matters regarding the external relations of Southern Cameroons were specifically excluded from the competence of the West Cameroon House of Assembly.

•    Any bills that were passed in the West Cameroon House of Assembly had to promulgated by the Commissioner for Cameroons to become law, in much the same way as President Ahidjo had to promulgate Law No. 24/61 establishing "The Federal Republic of Cameroun" on 1st Sept 1961, for it to become law in the state of La République du Cameroun;

•    From the foregoing, it should be clear that any motions passed in the West Cameroon House of Assembly regarding the foreign relations of that territory were patently unconstitutional and  utra vires the powers of the legislative assembly and, worse, had to be promulgated by the Commissioner for Cameroons to give them legal validity;

•    The above basic facts which are verifiable from the governing Constitution of West Cameroon (Order-in-Council) when these events took place will wipe the clouds from those giving any credence to the 'exercises of power' by a Premier of the West Cameroon Gov’t who had no constitutional authority to commit West Cameroon externally. 

Any claimed resolution of the West Cameroon House of Assembly would have been unconstitutional as outside the competence of that Assembly and, even if such a motion was passed, would have needed the promulgation of the British resident Commissioner to give it legal validity.

Mr Emmanuel Ngek Tatah Mentan asked a pointed question: If the UK were sincere, why did it not submit the so called “Top Secret” documents to the UNO, that world body that mandated the UK to carry through the constitutional talks?”

All said and done, a clear reading of international issues and events inform us that a despoiled, abused, emasculated, and marginalized people do not necessarily need legal bases to opt out.

Furthermore, the Banjul African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) ruling on the case pitting Southern Cameroons against La République remains the one and only international legal instrument that needs to be exploited fully by SCNC apologists and strategists.

Arguably only Professor Alain Didier Olinga of the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) has made the most razor-sharp analysis and critique of the ruling.

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